Issues of interest Vol.9, November 1982 by Justice Institute of British Columbia (Justice Institute of British Columbia) (Author)
ISSUES 
OF 
INTEREST 
VOLUME W. 9 
Justice Institute of British Columbia 
POLICE ACADEMY 
Written by John H. Post 
ISSUES OF IBTEUST 
(VOLUME m. 9) 
Written by John M. Post 
November 1982 
TABLE OF OORRBTS 
THE <JIARTD. OF RIGHTS - BREATHALYZER LAWS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
Is being compelled to give a sample of 
1>reath in violation of ll(c) of the . 
Charter, which establishes the right 
against incrimination? 
Was stopping the accused for a vehicle 
check an arbitrary detention and 
contrary to section g. of the Charter? 
R. v. Altseimer Ontario Court of Appeal September 1982 
TllllEATIRI~ BY ftK>RE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3 
Regina v. Anderson - County Court of Westminster 
Registry No. X82-8125 September 1982 
FALSE <DMPLAl.RT AGAillST POLICE - PUBLIC MISCllIEF 
- ADMISSIBILITY OF a>MPLAI.NT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 
R. v. Stapleton 66 C.C.C. (2d) 231. 
Ontario Court of Appeal February 1982 
IS A IElfCED a>MPOU11D A •snucroKE• ARD A •PLACE• PllOTECTED 
BY SECTIOR 306(1) CKIHlllAL a>DE? ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••· 5 
R. v. Thibault 66 C.C.C.(2d) 442 Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
Appeal Division, March 1982 
PllOTEC?IOH OF PRIVACY •••••••••••·········•••••••••••••••••••• 6 
R. v. Commissio 66 c.c.c. (2d) 65 
B. C. Court of Appeal January 1982 
- ii -
BLOOD SAMPLE - EVIDElllCE m 'lllE a>ITRAR.Y • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8 
The Queen and Meys - B. c. County Court No. XB0-5479 
New Westminster July 1982 
AS SX>lf &c; PRA.c::T'Ic&BLE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 
Ulrich and The Queen B. C. County Court 
No. FCR 14/82 Dawson Creek August 1982 
CAN 1T BE JUSTIFIED Cit JIEASOllWILE IOll. A POLICE OFP'ICEll. 
TO 1BJWTTLE SOMEOD WHO IS llAllDCUFPIID MD AT.READY IR A 
DETACIDIENT POLICE OFFICE? ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 12 
R. v. K. County Court No. 355 c.c.c. 
Kamloops Registry July 1982 
DOES '!BEU EXIST IR CABADA A 'QUALIFIED' DEFEBCE OF 
USE OF EXCESSIVE IOll.CE IR PREVERTIBG 'DIE a>MKISSIOl!I OF 
AB OFP'ElllCE IR A CASE OF ll>KICIDE? ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 13 
The queen v. Gee - Supreme Court of Canada - February 8, 1982 
POWERS OF ARREST IOll. BREACH OF 'DIE PEACE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16 
R. v. Lefebvre County Court of Vancouver 
Court File No. 02490FPowell River Registry 
September 15, 1982 
BIT MD 11D1i • • • LEAVIllG 'lllE SCERE 
TO ESCAPE CIVD. Cit ar.nnRAL LIABD.ITY 
R. v. Hofer 67 c.c.c. (2d) 134 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
......................... 19 
RI.CRT m OJlJRSEI. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 21 
R. v. Andrew County Court of Westminster 
No. X81-7324 July 1982 
ADMISSIBD.ITY OF S'lATBllEIT BY JOVUILE •••••••••••••••••••••••• 23 
B. and The Queen B. C. Supreme Court No. CC821271 
Vancouver October 1982. 
- iii -
ST.ATEllDTS ....................•..........................•..•.. 
The ritual question: "Officer, did you 
make any threats, or promises, or hold 
out any inducements or offers or hope 
of advantage or favour to the accused?" 
If the Crown omits to ask this 
question, does that mean that there is 
a lack of evidence to show that 
statement was voluntarily made? 
The Attorney General of B. C. v. Hayes 
Supreme Court of B. C. August 1982 Kamloops, B. c. 
24 
CREDIBILITI OF VITllJESSES ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 25 
R. v. Farstad County Court of Kootenay 
No. F/3/82 Creston Registry September 1982 
OBSTRUCTIRG A PEACE OFFICER. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 
R. v. Guthrie [1982) 5 W.W.R. 385 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
SlWlCHillG A LAV OFFICE - PRIVILBGED a>IBJHICATIOR • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 29 
Supreme Court of Canada June 1982 Simon Descoteaux, 
Centre Commucutaire Juridique de Montreal v. 
Alexandre Mierzwinski and Le Procureur de la Province 
de guebec and Le Barreau du guebec, La Commission des 
Droits de la Personne. 
USING A amDIT CAKD OBTilllED BY 'DIE a>MKISSIOR OF A 
CR.IKE (FIBDim;) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 31 
R. v. Costello B. c. Court of Appeal October 1982 CA810630 
TIDBITS ........................................................ 32 
- 1 -
THE CllAR.TER. OF BIGHTS - BKKATBALYZER. LAWS 
Is being coapelled to give a 8811ple of breath in violation of Section 
ll(c) of the Charter, which establishes the right against fncrillina-
tion? 
Vas stopping the accused for a fthf.cle check an arbitrary detention 
and contrary to section g. of the Charter! 
R. v. Altseimer Ontario Court of Appeal September 1982 
Some apparently bizarre court decisions are coming our way from the 
east via our news media. Most have been in respect to breathalyzer 
laws and our new Charter of Rights. 
It seems that the Ontario Court of Appeal was anxious to dispel! some 
of these notions when it handed down these reasons for judgment in 
this Altseimer case. At one stage this Court said: 
"In view of the number of cases in Ontario 
trial Courts in which Charter provisions are 
being argued, and especially in view of some 
of the bizarre and colourful arguments being 
advanced, it may be appropriate to observe 
that the Charter does not intend transforma-
tion of our legal system or the paralysis of 
law enforcement. Extravagant interpretations 
can only trivialize and diminish respect for 
the Charter which is part of the supreme law 
of this country". 
Altseimer was convicted of "80 mg" and successfully appealed the 
conviction. The Crown took the case to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
and the defence raised a number of arguments under the provisions of 
the Charter. 
The facts are as follows: 
1:23 a.m. 
1 :27 a.m. 
1 :36 a.m. 
1:39 a.m. 
1:50 a.m. 
2:12 and• 
2:21 a.m. 
the accused's car was stopped by police; 
road side test was administered and the accused 
failed it; 
upon the accused's request, a second roadside test 
is performed with similar results; 
accused arrived at detachment (which was a very 
short distance away); 
breathalyzer operator arrives at detachment; 
breath samples are analyzed. 
- 2 -
The County Court Judge who heard the first appeal by the accused had 
held that 22 minutes from the time of the technician's arrival and the 
first test being administered was not "as soon as practicable" and he 
therefore held that the well known presumption of equalization was not 
available to the Crown. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed quite strongly and might as well have 
said that if the County Court had known the case law, he would not 
have found as he did. The Criminal Code does not say the tests have 
to be taken as soon as possible but as soon as practicable. The 
County Court's determination "was an error in law". 
Then the Court dealt with the issues raised under the Charter which it 
really was not required to do, as the alleged offence did not occur 
since the Charter became effective. The Court of Appeal proposed, 
however, ••• "to defer the question of retrospectivity and determine 
first whether the Charter could apply to the facts of this case". 
The accused claimed that being compelled to give a sample of breath 
violates his rights against self incrimination. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that it was plain from the language 
used in the Charter (section ll(c)) that the protection, as it was 
before the Charter becoming effective, is protection against "testi-
monial compulsion and nothing else". In other words, it protects him 
from having to enter the witness box or the use of what he says while 
testifying in subsequent judicial proceedings 
The accused also claimed that his apprehension had amounted to arbi-
trary detention contrary to his rights under section 9 of the 
Charter. The court responded that the vehicle check was not unlawful 
nor was there any detention involved until the accused failed his 
roadside test and was arrested for a contravention of section 236 c.c. 
By means of a general comment, the Ontario Court of Appeal said that 
in some of the decisions on the Charter's application that have 
received so much notoriety in Ontario, the trial Judges were simply 
wrong. 
Crown' s appeal allowed 
Conviction restored 
* * * * * 
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THUATEBIRG BY PROBE 
Regina v. Anderson - County Court of Westminster - Registry No. 
X82-8125 September 1982 
The accused was involved in a car accident. The investigating officer 
processed the accused for a drinking/driving of fence. It does not 
seem an overstatement that the accused was furious about this. When 
he went to I .C.B.C. and discovered the contemplated charge against 
him, he uttered threatening words about the constable. The accused 
took the matter a step further and phoned the police station and spoke 
to a corporal whom he told that he would cause the constable's death. 
The corporal did not pass the threats on to the constable but saw to 
it that a charge of "threatening" under section 33l(l)(a) of the 
Criminal Code was preferred. 
The defence had been that the intended victim was unaware of the 
threats and therefore the offence was not complete. 
The County Court Judge quoted from a reason for judgment by the 
Supreme Court of Canada* which had found the offence created by this 
section "remarkable" in many respects and held that it did not matter: 
1. whether or not there was intent to carry out the threat; 
2. that the accused acted for any specific purpose; 
3. what the accused's motives were; 
4. whether the threats raised the possibility of imminent or 
remote danger; 
5. what the effect of threat on the prospective victim was; or 
6. if the person threatened was aware of the fact that he was 
threatened. 
The County Court Judge concluded: 
• • the offence of threatening under 
Section 33l(l)(a) is committed at the time 
the threat is made in any of the ways set out 
in the section, and it matters not the 
circumstances as they affect or do not affect 
the recipient or intended recipient of the 
threat". 
Accused convicted 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Nabis (1974) 18 c.c.c. (2d) 148 
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FALSE a>MPLAIRT AGAIBST POLICE - PUBLIC llISCllIBF 
- ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPLAillT 
R. v. Stapleton 66 c.c.c. (2d) 231. 
Ontario Court of Appeal February 1982 
An 18 year old youth gave a statement to an Ontario police depart-
ment's complaints officer claiming that he was assaulted by two 
officers of that force. An investigation proved the allegation false 
and the youth was charged with public mischief (e. 128(e) Criminal 
Code). During hie trial, the defence counsel took the position that a 
voir dire should be conducted to determine if the statement to the 
complaint officer was voluntarily made. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
held that the accused's statement was not like admissions, confessions 
or denials made by an accused to a person in authority when questioned 
regarding the commission of an offence. The making of the statement 
constituted the offence; in other words, it was the actus reus. 
Accused's conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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IS A PERCID (J)MPOOJID A -STJWcrmur AlllD A .PLACK .. PROTECTED BY SECTION 
306(1) CllllIRAL CODE? 
R. v. Thibault 66 C.C.C.(2d) 442. Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
Appeal Division, March 1982 
It is an offence to break and enter a place with the intent to commit 
an indictable offence therein. Section 306( 4) of the Criminal Code 
provides that a "place" means, among other things, a structure. The 
accused scaled the 7 foot high fence of a compound which contained a 
fuel storage tank, a warehouse and an office building. The two gates 
giving access to the compound were locked and the accused was appre-
hended when he removed the cap of a gas tank. He had a five gallon 
can and siphon hose in his possession. He disputed his conviction of 
breaking and entering a place with the intent to commit an indictable 
offence therein. The defence claimed that the compound was not a 
"structure" and, therefore not a "place". 
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that what may be a "structure" 
for one purpose will not be for another. It may well be that some 
"erection" is not recognized as a building under a building code or 
municipal by-law, however, if you break into it to steal the content, 
one may find it protected by the criminal law. A fenced farmer's 
field is not a structure, however, a compound enclosed by a fence 
obviously to keep people away from buildings and equipment is a 
structure whether or not it has a roof. 
* * * * * 
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PJWTECTION OF PRIVACY 
R. v. Commissio 66 c.c.c. {2d) 65 
B. C. Court of Appeal January 1982 
An authorization to intercept private communication mentions the 
offence which the person(s) named are suspected to commit. When the 
intercepted communication leads to or is in relation to another 
offence, that does not necessarily mean that this evidence is inadmis-
sible should the Crown proceed against someone for that other 
of fence. There are several cases on this issue including decisions by 
the B. C. Court of Appeal*. 
In this case, police had grounds to believe the accused and others 
conspired to import heroin and an authorization to intercept private 
communications was granted by the Court on June 10. The interception 
gave police reasonable grounds to believe that the accused and others 
were into counterfeit money and had some in their possession. This 
was by June 30. On July 9, the police officers made Crown Counsel 
aware of their reasonable and probable grounds regarding the DK>ney as 
well as the identification of another party the interception had 
surfaced and who was not mentioned in the authorization. Police were 
advised that there was no need for a new authorization re the money 
and on July 10 the original authorization in respect to the heroin was 
renewed. 
The accused was convicted of having conspired to possess counterfeit 
money. He appealed claiming that the evidence obtained by intercep-
ting his private communications by means of the "heroin" authorization 
was inadmissible in regards to the "counterfeit money" charge. He 
claimed that the interceptions in these circumstances were unlawful. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that intercepted communications in 
relation to an of fence other than the one for which the authorization 
was granted is admissible in evidence if it is unanticipated. Here 
Crown Counsel and police were aware and had their grounds to believe 
that the accused was into counterfeit money when they renewed the 
authorization. When an authorization is issued or renewed the Judge 
must be satisfied that other investigative procedures have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed or that there is an urgency to investigate by 
this means. When the Crown applied to renew the authorization, their 
·• R. v. Rouse.and Mclnroy (1977) 36 C.C.C. (2d) 257 [1977] 4 W.W.R. 
734 
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purpose was perhaps to pursue the ••heroin" matter but certainly also 
to investigate the "money•• affair. Without revealing this to the 
Judge, he was unable to determine the above mentioned prerequisites to 
the authorization. The Judge may well have granted it in regards to 
the heroin and refused it for the money. If that was the case, the 
evidence regarding the counterfeit money would, of course, have been 
inadmissible. Concluded the B. C. Court of Appeal: 
"In short, it is my opinion that the 
rule which permits the introduction of 
evidence with respect to an offence 
not specified in the authorization but 
which turns up unexpectedly in the 
course of the interception, does not 
extend to evidence with respect to an 
offence that is being investigated at 
the time of the authorization or at 
the time of renewal. To decide other-
wise would permit a single authoriza-
tion to spread to offences and persons 
never contemplated by the authorizing 
Judge who is charged with the respon-
sibility for applying the rigorous 
tests established by the protection of 
the privacy sections of the Criminal 
Code." 
* * * * * 
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BLOOD SAMPLE - EVIDENCE TO THE CO:RTRAIY 
The Queen and Meys - B. C. ·county Court No. XB0-5479 
New Westminster July 1982 
The accused was injured in an accident and taken to hospital where a 
nurse took a sample of blood. She put the blood in sterile vials 
which contained a white powdery substance. A crime lab analyst kept 
the vials in a refrigerator for over four weeks before he had time to 
analyze the blood and determine that it contained 17 4 milligrams of 
alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood. 
The accused was convicted of "over 80 mg". The _ Crown had relied on 
the presumption in section 237(l)(c.l) c.c. to prove that at the time 
of driving the blood alcohol level of the accused was over the "80 
mg" • However, the accused appealed, claiming that there was evidence 
to the contrary which negated the presumption that h~s blood alcohol 
level at the time the blood sample was taken was not equal to that at 
the time of driving. 
The nurse had called the powdery substance "a preservative" but had no 
personal knowledge what it consisted of. The Crime-lab analyst testi-
fied that it was sodi\DD. fluoride which kills any bacteria and prevents 
the blood from coagulating. He said the substance could in no way 
affect the blood so as to render the test inaccurate. 
A defence analyst testified that blood may "putrify" when it sits for 
awhile. This , he said, can cause the alcohol content of the blood to 
increase or decrease. The former if contaminants are introduced and 
the latter if it breaks down and the alcohol evaporates. He agreed 
that sodium fluoride would prevent this and that no refrigeration is 
necessary if enough is mixed with the blood. 
The question now remaining was if the evidence of the defence analyst 
amounted to evidence to the contrary. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal said in 1973*: 
"Any evidence therefore, tending to 
show that at the time of the offence 
the proportion was within the per-
mitted limit is 'evidence to the 
contrary' within the meaning of the 
subsection". 
* R. v. Davis (1973) 14 c.c.c. (2d) 513 
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The Supreme Court of Canada accepted this descriptionl and added in 
another case2 
"Thus, any evidence tending to invali-
date the result of the tests may be 
adduced on behalf of the accused in 
order to dispute the charge against 
him. • • • It is not necessary in 
such cases that the rebutting evidence 
should do no more than raise a reason-
able doubt ••• ". 
The County Court Judge held that in this case no inference of impro-
priety can be drawn :from the defence evidence or that of the Crown 
witnesses. There was no evidence that the delay affected the accuracy 
of the analysis. As a matter of fact the defence analyst had in fact 
verified that the sodium fluoride is capable of killing bacteria that 
could otherwise have been in the vial. 
* * * * * 
1 R. v. Moreau.42 C.C.C. (2d) 525 
2 R. v. Crosthwait 52 c.c.c. (2d) 129 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
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AS SOOB AS PRACTICABLE 
Ulrich and The een B. C. County Court 
No. FCR 14 82 Dawson Creek August 1982 
At 19:55 the accused was arrested for impaired driving and a demand 
for breath samples was made. The officer radioed to the Detachment 
office to have the technician alerted that tests had to be made. At 
20:05 the officer and the accused arrived at the Detachment but the 
technician did not show until 20:38, samples were analysed at 20:47 
and 21:02, both indicating a blood alcohol level well in excess of 80 
mg. There was no explanation given for the 38 minute delay either to 
the accused at the time nor during the accused's trial. The trial 
judge felt that no such explanation was necessary as the evidence 
explained the delay although not the reason for it. The accused 
appealed his conviction claiming that the trial judge had erred. He 
claimed that in the absence of knowing the reason for the delay the 
Court cannot determine if the tests were made "as soon as practic-
able". 
The County Court Judge held that the arresting officer's testimony 
that the technician was not on duty, was nothing more than an asser-
tion that "he was not there because he was not there" • To determine 
if a sample was analyzed as soon as practicable, the prerequisite to 
the "certificate short cuts" and· "the presumption of equalization" the 
Court must in the case of a delay be informed of the reasons. 
Appeal allowed 
Conviction set aside 
A similar defence was advanced at trial and again at appeal before the 
same B. C. County Court Judge (August 1982 No. C 50/82 Prince George 
Registry in MacEacheran and The Queen). The accused was stopped at 
23:45 and arrested for impaired driving five minutes later. As the 
accused' s truck could not remain where it was a tow truck was called 
and while waiting for it to arrive a demand for breath samples was 
made of the accused at 23:57. The constable and the accused waited 
for "a long time" and as the tow truck did not show, the constable 
drove the truck to a safe location and transported the accused to the 
detachment arriving there at 00:20. The tests were made at 00:26 and 
00:40 resulting in readings well in excess of "80 mg". 
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Precedents draw attention to the distinction between "'as soon as 
practicable" and "as soon as possible". Where the former term is 
used, all circumstances must be considered. Although "a deliberate 
delay for a wrong reason does not come within the phrase", the provi-
sion "contemplates that the officer has other duties aside from 
escorting the accused promptly to a breathalyzer and those duties must 
be considered". 
Defence had belabored the possibility to have another officer attend 
to wait for the tow truck, or move the accused's vehicle; or why had 
the officer not moved the truck earlier. This was entirely discre-
tionary, said the Court. Waiting for the tow truck "formed a legiti-
mate part of the officer's duties", solely related to the accused's 
case. 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
Crown Counsel: 
Trial .Judge: 
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•ean it ever be justified or :reasonable for a police 
officer 1:0 throttle B011eone who is handcuffed and 
already in a de1:aclmen1: police office•? 
·11o·. 
R. v. K. County Court No. 355 c.c.c. Kamloops Registry July 1982 
A motorist who bad a "considerable quantity of alcohol to drink" was 
arrested by the accused (a police officer) for impaired driving. The 
motorist who complained that the handcuffs were too tight was 
"abusive" during the entire encounter he had with the accused 
officer. In the breathalyzer room the motorist was told to ·sit down 
three times and after the last request the accused officer lunged at 
the motorist and choked him causing him bodily ha.rm (injuries are not 
described in the judgment). This resulted in a conviction of assault 
causing bodily harm against the officer, which he appealed. 
The accused officer bad testified that when he attempted to sit the 
motorist down he (the motorist) attempted to knee him in the groin and 
that the force he used was necessary to subdue his prisoner. This, 
the defence counsel argued brought the accused officer within section 
25 of the Criminal Code which renders him immune from criminal lia-
bility if he used no more force than was necessary. 
The trial judge had applied the objective test to determine if the 
accused officer bad a reasonable belief that it was necessary to apply 
force. He bad weighed all circumstances to determine the reasonable-
ness of the belief the officer claimed to have. Defence counsel 
argued that a subjective test should have been applied, that is if the 
officer's testimony was that he bad such beliefs, it should be 
accepted. 
The County Court held that regardless what test was applied, the 
matter was outside the purview of section 25 C.C. The trial judge had 
found as a fact that in this case it had never been necessary to apply 
force, leave alone the degree of it. 
* * * * * 
Conviction Upheld 
Appeal Dismissed 
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Does there aist in canada a • qualified' defence 
of use of ezcessive force in preventing the 
coma:l.ssion of an of fence in a case of hOlli.cicle? 
The queen v. Gee - Supreme Court of Canada - February 8, 1982 
Gee, the accused, was a male prostitute and female impersonator. He, 
a female prostitute and a male friend attended at the home of "a kinky 
trick with lots of money". According to Gee, the male friend got into 
women's lingerie upon the request of "the trick". While Gee and the 
female prostitute were doing likewise, the male friend and their 
client got involved in a fight. To prevent their friend from being 
assaulted, Gee and the female prostitute struck their client over 
the head with bottles, a lamp and even a frying pan, until he was 
dead. 
The Crown's theory was that the three attempted a robbery and that 
their victim resisted. 
The accused and his female co-accused were convicted of second degree 
murder. They appealed successfully gaining a new trial. This 
decision the Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The issue in this case is whether in Canada there is a defence for 
murder where the accused honestly but mistakenly used more force than 
was necessary to prevent the commission of a crime; or should the 
application of such force where it caused death be a justification to 
reduce murder to manslaughter. 
When one person causes the death of another person, he commits homi-
cide. Homicide which is not culpable is not an of fence. Culpable 
homicide is an offence and is either murder or manslaughter. In this 
case it was alleged that the accused caused the death of a person by 
means of an unlawful act. However, section 27 of the Criminal Code 
makes lawful what otherwise would be unlawful. It simply states that 
everyone may use as much force as is reasonably necessary to prevent 
the commission of a crime for which a person may be arrested without 
warrant and would cause "immediate and serious injury to the person or 
property of anyone". 
It must be remembered that in view of the defence evidence, this 
section must in this case be applied to its application where one 
person acts to defend another 
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The section that deals with a person defending himself is section 34 
of the Criminal Code. It, in essence states that a person who has not 
provoked an assault on himself is justified to repel the physical 
force that is applied to him with no more force than is necessary to 
defend himself as long as the force he uses is not intended to cause 
death or grievous bodily harm. However, where such force to repel an 
assault does cause death or grievous bodily harm, then he was justi-
fied if he had a reasonable apprehension "from the violence with which 
the assault was originally made or with which the assailant pursues 
his purpose "that his death or grievous bodily harm to him will 
result. In addition, the person who so defends himself, must believe 
on reasonable and probable grounds that there is no other way to 
prevent death or grievous bodily harm to himself. 
The defence counsel argued that if there is justification in certain 
circumstances to cause death of an assailant in defending one's self, 
this ought also to be the case where a person is defending someone 
else. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal had held that if a person prevents a crime 
from being committed (in this case one person defending another), then 
if the excessive force applied by an honest but mistaken belief ca.uses 
death, the offence committed is manslaughter and not murder (this is 
the law in Australia). 
The question then to be answered by the Supreme Court of Canada was if 
a successful defence to murder under section 27 C.C. where it is shown 
that there was an honest but mistaken belief that such force was 
necessary may result in a conviction of manslaughter. 
The Crown argued that the use of excessive force which causes death is 
murder, while the defence argued that the offence may be reduced to 
manslaughter. Submitted the defence: 
• • should a qualified defence of exces-
sive force in self-defence exist in Canada by 
analogy, a qualified defence of excess! ve 
force in the prevention of an offence should 
also be admitted". 
The Court observed that this question was never raised before in 
Canada and was difficult to answer in view of the two differently 
worded statutory provisions (sections 27 and 34 C.C.). 
- 15 -
The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the distinction between murder 
and manslaughter and reiterated that it was in the intent of the 
person who caused the death. It reasoned that in a case of self-
defence the person who caused the death may well have intended to 
cause it. If it was reasonably necessary for him to do so to preserve 
his life or grievous bodily harm being inflicted on him, he did so 
with impunity because of the law in relation to self defence. 
In relation to section 27 (prevention of the commission of an 
offence), which includes protecting someone else, the Supreme Court of 
Canada said: 
"The section clearly contemplates the possi-
bility of a killing and can even extend its 
justification to killing with the intent to 
kill, if it is reasonably necessary". 
The Court concluded from this: 
"If the force is reasonable in all the cir-
cumstances, the accused is entitled to an 
acquittal; if not, he is in my view guilty of 
murder if he has the required intent". 
In Canada in circumstances where a person is justified in using force, 
he is criminally responsible for the excess thereof (s. 26 c.c.). 
The Supreme Court in essence held that if a successful defence is 
raised under section 27 c.c. the accused must be acquitted. If it is 
found that the force used was excessive, then, if the accused had the 
specific intent to cause death, he is guilty of murder. If he used 
excessive force and caused death unintentionally, then he committed 
manslaughter. 
In other words, in Canada it cannot be said that force can be 
partially justified and no "qualified" defence of use of excessive 
force in the prevention of the commission of an offence does exist. 
* * * * * 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
New trial to be held. 
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POWERS OF AR.UST FOR BREACH OF r11E PEACE 
R. v. Lefebvre County Court of Vancouver Court File No. 02490F 
Powell River Registry September 15, 1982 
In theory, any criminal offence is a breach of the peace, however, a 
breach of the peace is not a criminal offence. Yet every citizen has 
a right to preserve the peace and a peace officer has a sworn duty to 
do so. Both are robed by statute law (section 30 and 31 C.C.) with 
authority to arrest a person for committing a breach of the peace or 
to prevent one. Said this County Court: 
"An arrest for breach of the peace is an 
adjunct to the criminal law. It is a form of 
preventative justice not retributive jus-
tice. It does not result in a conviction, 
but a preventative remedy ••• " 
These were some of the comments (or versions thereof) by the County 
Court Judge when he dealt with an appeal by the Crown of the acquittal 
of a charge of obstructing a peace officer in the lawful performance 
of his duty when he (the officer) made an arrest for a breach of the 
peace. The trial Judge (Provincial Court) had held that neither 
police nor anyone is empowered to arrest for breach of the peace. 
Therefore the accused bad a right to resist the arrest, he concluded. 
The County Court Judge lamented the fact that so many misconceptions 
exist among peace officers about the "breach of the peace" provisions 
in the Criminal Code and at common law. 
Police in the common law system actually carry out the function for 
which every citizen is responsible. Basically, the citizen has, by 
statute and common law, authority to carry out a considerable portion 
of the police function. Policing is not captured by a chosen few but 
is a community business. However, society has assigned their function 
to police officers and, in spite of discretionary authorities, have 
made them duty bound to maintain the public peace, the normal state of 
society - t~e Queen's peace. 
The statutory authorities granted police and citizen alike fall some-
times far short of equipping them to deal with those who commit, are 
about to commit, or are renewing a breach of the peace which is not 
merely an annoyance or any disturbance. 
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The County Court Judge accepted "for modem purposes" to accept the 
following observational: 
"We are emboldened to say that there is a 
breach of the peace whenever harm is actually 
done or is likely to be done to a person or 
in his presence to his property or a person 
is in fear of being so harmed through an 
assault, an affray, a riot, unlawful assembly 
or other disturbance. 
It is for this breach of the peace when done 
in his presence or the reasonable apprehen-
sion of it taking place that a constable or 
anyone else, may arrest an of fender without 
warrant". 
If such is the duty and the right of a police officer to prevent or 
stop a breach of the peace (as that expression is defined), then "it 
could logically follow" that the obstruction of a peace officer in the 
performance of that duty would justify a conviction under section 118 
of the Criminal Code. 
The controversy whether section 31( 1) c.c. confers a power to arrest 
or is merely a protection for anyone who interferes in a breach of the 
peace, was the topic in the famous Biron2 case. The Supreme Court of 
Canada rejected the latter view and adopted the former. 
A breach of the peace was an offence at common law. 
dictates that in Canada no offence is known at common 
fore a person cannot be charged with a breach of the 
the Judge's comments that the provisions in sections 
are preventative and not retributive. 
Section 8 c.c. 
law, and there-
peace. Hence , 
30 and 31 C.C. 
Now, of course, the practical question arises what to do with a person 
who was arrested for a breach of the peace only. In view of the pre-
ventative nature of the provisions, the peace officer's right to con-
tinue the detention of a person so arrested evaporates when the 
reasonable and probable grounds upon which the arrest was made, cease 
to exist. When the arrest has restored peace, the remedy the arrest 
provision provides, has reached its objective. Any continuation of 
detention beyond that remedy is, no doubt, excessi.ve medicine and may 
well be an unlawful confinement. 
1 Errol Howell 1981 C.A. 31 at 37 
2 R. v. Biron 23 c.c.c. (ld) 513 
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Where the arrest (and the removal from the scene where this is 
necessary) does not remove the reasonable and probable grounds that 
the prisoner will renew or join in a breach of the peace, it justifies 
continuation of custody and section 453 and 454 C.C. do apply. It has 
been heldl that if such grounds persist, then the person may be placed 
(by a Judicial Act) on a peace bond at common law. 
In any event, the County Court Judge held that a peace officer has 
authority to arrest for a breach of the peace. The trial judge should 
have explored whether or not in the circumstances the arrest was 
justified. If so, the officer was in the lawful performance of his 
duty. 
* * * * * 
1 R. v. Compton [1978) 5 W.W.R. 473. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
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HIT MD IDH • • • LEAVIIE 'DIE SCENE 
TO ESCAPE CIVIL OK. CRDIINAL LIABILIT! 
R. v. Hofer 67 c.c.c. (2d) 134 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
In early morning hours the accused lost control of his car and crashed 
into two parked cars and then into a house. He left the scene of the 
accident "in haste" without giving his name or address. 
He was charged with hit and run under section 223(2) c.c. The accused 
stated that he left the scene to escape the execution of warrants 
which were outstanding for his failure to pay fines. In that respect, 
he did leave the scene to escape this liability, but not one arising 
from the accident he was involved in. In addition, there was evidence 
that the accused paid his fines later that same date and reported the 
accident to police in the afternoon. 
The Provincial Court Judge had apparently followed a comment made by a 
Justice of the Quebec Court of Appeal! who suggested that the civil or 
criminal liability the hit and run driver must be trying to escape is 
liability arising from the accident. (Fournier apparently intended to 
escape arrest for armed robbery when he was involved in an accident). 
The Saskatchewan Supreme Court Justice disagreed with this view and 
concluded that it was not binding on him and answered the following 
two questions: 
1. Does the intent to escape the execution of outstanding warrants 
constitute "intent to escape civil or criminal liability" within 
the meaning of section 233(2) c.c.? 
2. Does the intent to escape civil or criminal liability within the 
meaning of section 233(3) C.C. include only intent to escape such 
liability arising from the accident itself? 
The answer to question #1 was "Yes". The Court held that injuries or 
"eventual liability" do have to be proven to convict under section 233 
C.C. What constitutes the offence is the specific intent of escaping 
liability and the act of failing to stop. They are the mens rea and 
actus reus respectively. 
1 Fournier v • .'.l'he Queen (1979) 8 CR (3d) 248 
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The answer to question #2 was "No". 
The Court reasoned the urgency of evading a greater liability may 
overshadow the concern respecting a lesser one. In other words, it 
becomes worth the risk to evade a more serious liability than that for 
hit and fun. After all, the rebuttal of the presumption that one 
leaves the scene of an accident to escape civil or criminal liability, 
can hardly be "I was trying to get away from a more serious crime". 
That would mean that only law abiding citizens are compelled to remain 
at the scene of an accident , and wanted or fleeing criminals can 
continue on their way with impunity. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Matter referred back to Provincial Court 
for sentencing. 
* * * * * 
- 21 -
RIGHT TO COURSE!. 
R. v. Andrew County Court of Westminster No. XSl-7324 July 1982 
The accused was in the breathalyzer room under demand to give samples 
of his breath (by the Court referring to the officer as the .. arresting 
officer" and to the accused as the .. detainee" t it is assumed that the 
accused was arrested and detained) and asked to make a phone call to 
his lawyer. The officer dialed the number for the accused who had a 
two minute conversation but was apparently unable to reach his 
lawyer. The officer was found to be "obviously aware" of this and the 
fact that the accused was waiting for a return call. A few minutes 
after the telephone conversation terminatedt the accused was demanded 
to give samples of his breath. He did not respond and walked out of 
the breathalyzer room. The accused now appealed his conviction of 
failing to give samples of his breath. 
It was found as a fact that the officer knew that the accused was 
waiting for his lawyer to call back. It was also found that from the 
time of driving to the first breath testt 35 minutes elapsed. 
The County Court Judge held that the "right to counsel" and the 
requirement that the test must be taken "as soon as practicable" must 
be balanced. The accused should have been allowed more time to 
contact his lawyer. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Conviction set aside 
In his reasons for judgment the Judge said he was persuaded by the 
reasons given on this topic by a brother Judge:l 
"The law with respect to the right to counsel 
has been summarized by Mr. 
0
Michael Henryt a 
Research Officer with the Ontario Legal Plant 
in a note printed at p. 309 of 12 C.R. (3d) 
he has digested the present state of the law 
in the following propositions: 
'1. A person detained for the purpose of 
taking a breathalyzer test is entitled 
to contact and speak with a lawyer 
before taking the test. 
1 R. v. Wood New Westminster Registry No. X817094 July 1982 (p. 309 
Vol. 12 Criminal Reports (2d)) 
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2. The entitlement of a detainee to 
consult with counsel before submitting 
to a breathalyzer test is dependent 
upon his request to do so being bona 
fide (i.e. not simply to create delay, 
etc.). 
3. The right to counsel does not extend 
to a right to insist upon the personal 
attendance of counsel at the breath-
alyzer test. 
4. The right to consult with counsel 
involves a right (of an, as yet, 
slightly uncertain nature) to conduct 
such consultation in private. 
5. Where the detainee, through no fault 
of the police, is unable to contact a 
laWYer, he or she has not been denied 
the right to counsel and has no 
"reasonable excuse" for refusing to 
provide a breath sample. 
6. The right of a detainee to consult 
with counsel before submitting to a 
breath test includes an entitlement to 
make as many phone calls as are 
reasonably necessary for this purpose. 
7. Where a detainee is denied his or her 
right to counsel but does not refuse 
to provide a breath sample, the evi-
dence of such breath test is admis-
sible, notwithstanding having been 
illegally obtained.'" 
* * * * * 
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ADHISSIBILITI OF STATEMENT BY J1JVERILE 
B. and The Queen B. C. Supreme Court No. CC821271 Vancouver 
October 1982. 
The accused, a 16 year old juvenile, was the passenger in a stolen 
car. Police stopped the car and for approximately 20 seconds the 
accused had a gun trained at her from a distance of 3 feet. About 5 
minutes later an officer who described the juvenile as being scared, 
warned her, informed her of her right to counsel and interviewed her. 
The girl admitted to have stolen the car the night before (together 
with a boy) from a person they knew. She was charged with a delin-
quency, to wit theft, and was convicted. The statement was the only 
evidence against the accused and had been ruled admissible by the 
Juvenile Court Judge. The defence had claimed, to no avail, that the 
statement was taken too soon after the traumatic experience of being 
held at gunpoint. Furthermore, the trial judge held that once the 
warning was given, there was no need to give an explanation of it. 
This was in answer to a claim that the immediacy of the questioning 
made an unsolicited explanation of the options open to the juvenile 
(to remain silent and/or consult a lawyer) necessary to assure the 
alternatives were understood. 
The Supreme Court ref erred to four cases* which contain the guidelines 
for taking statements from juveniles. In regards to the explanation 
of the warning, the Court said its necessity should at least have been 
considered by the trial judge before admitting the statement in evi-
dence. This had aggrevated the already borderline admissibility of 
the statement which had been "rushed" in view of the circumstances. 
Statement was held to be inadmissible 
Acquittal ordered. 
* * * * * 
* 1. Re A (1975) 5 w.w.R. 425 
2. R.V'. J. 29 CR 249 
3. R. v. Y. 36 CR 339 
4. R. v. W. 11 CRNS 11 
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The ritual question: "Officer, did you make any threats, or promises, 
or hold out any inducements or offers or hope of advantage or favour 
to the accused?" 
If the Crown omits to ask this question, does that mean that there is 
a lack of evidence to show that statement was voluntarily made? 
The Attorney General of B. C. v. Bayes Supreme Court of B. c. August 
1982 Kamloops, B. C. 
The accused had given a statement to a police officer regarding a 
motor vehicle accident in which he was involved. The accused was 
charged with an offence resulting from the accident and a voir dire 
was conducted to determine the statement's admissibility in evidence. 
The Crown did not ask the police officer the above mentioned "ritual" 
question and as a consequence the Provincial Court Judge held that the 
statement was inadmissible. The Crown appealed this decision to the 
B. c. Supreme Court which rejected the defence position and the trial 
judge's view. The Supreme Court Justice felt that voluntariness is 
determined from all events surrounding the taking of the statement and 
not on the officer's opinion of what he did. As a matter of fact, the 
Justice went as far as to suggest that the ritual question is actually 
improper. Whether the actions of the person in authority were 
threats 1 promises or inducements is for the Judge to decide and not 
the person in authority. If the officer states: "No" 1 it is simply 
his opinion which should not be sought when deciding the voluntary 
nature of a statement. 
Crown's view upheld. 
Comment: This view is no doubt interesting, but one wonders if that 
ritual question is asked to solicit the officer's legal interpretation 
of his actions or simply to be exhaustive and in essence ask: "Is 
this everything or is there something else we should know about in 
respect to the question in issue - the voluntariness of the state-
ment?" 
But whatever the reason is, its omission should not necessarily result 
in a statemen& being inadmissible. 
* * * * * 
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CUDIBILIT'f 01' VITDSSES 
R. v. Farstad County Court of Kootenay No. F/3/82 Creston Registry 
September 1982 
The accused, charged with refusing to give samples of his breath, 
testified at his trial that he had requested to phone his lawyer at 
the time of his arrest and again in the breathalyzer room when he was 
told to blow. 
The arresting officer (as well as the technician) testified that the 
accused had made no such request from them or anyone in their 
presence. The accused had simply refused, as supplying a sample was 
"against his constitutional rights". He was then placed in cells. 
After that, the accused requested to phone his lawyer and was accommo-
dated to do so. 
The trial judge had believed the officers. He said that even con-
stables coming straight out of boot camp know that ref using a suspect 
to phone his lawyer is defence for "refusal". Furthermore, if he did 
not believe the officers, then he would have to accept that the 
constables were willing to jeopardize their careers by perjuring them-
selves. 
The defence had asked the trial Court to consider the consistency in 
the accused's testimony, referring to the fact that he asked for a 
lawyer after the offence of refusing was complete. The Judge said 
that he was inclined to take a realistic approach. The accused dis-
covered that his refusal resulted in having to spend the night in goal 
and he decided then to contact a lawyer. 
The accused was convicted and appealed claiming that the trial judge's 
conclusion was not supported by the evidence, in that he had deter-
mined that the police officers were credible strictly because they 
were trained and would not jeopardize their careers. After all, 
jeopardy and expertise do not render someone credible in regards to 
being truthful when relating an event. 
The County Court Judge rejected the defence argument and reasoned that 
not only did the trial judge hear the evidence of the officers which 
contradicted the accused's testimony but he had also the benefit of 
observing the witnesses' demeanor, appearance and non verbal coDDDuni-
cation. These cannot be recorded in the transcript but are 
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part of the evidence upon which a trial judge may base his reason to 
believe or disbelieve a witness, a decision Courts of Appeal seldom 
interfere with. 
The trial judge had accepted the evidence of the police officers over 
that of the accused, not because they were police officers ("that 
would be a serious error") but having considered all the evidence. 
The finding of guilt had been reasonable and is supported by all the 
evidence. 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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OBSTIDCTIBG A PEACE OFFICER. 
R. v. Guthrie [1982) 5 w.w.R. 385 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
"'This is going to be interesting to see the system working" the 
accused said when she was arrested for obstructing a peace officer in 
the performance of his duty. The accused was seen walking across the 
parking lot of the police station in the middle of the night. As 
there had been break-ins in the private cars of police off ice rs, the 
two patrolmen had asked the accused to stop. Asking, "Why"? she had 
continued on her way and was then pnysically prevented from walking 
any further and told that unless she identified herself she would be 
detained. As this was to no avail, the accused (who was otherwise 
described as "polite, not nasty or abusive") was placed in the police 
car with "minor resistance" on her part and at that time charged with 
obstruction. Then the officers inspected the lot and found a car door 
standing open, but it had not been forced and nothing had been taken. 
When questioned if she was involved with that car the accused had 
remained silent. Eventually, on her way to the remand centre, the 
accused identified herself. 
The accused was convicted of obstructing the officers and appealed 
this verdict, claiming that in the circumstances, the failure to 
identify herself did not amount to such obstruction. 
The issue of course is whether this case is distinct from the now 
famous Moore easel. Moore was found to ride his bicycle through an 
intersection against the traffic light. He had refused to identify 
himself, which would have resulted in the officer being prevented from 
charging the accused with the non-arrestable traffic offence. The 
officer had arrested Moore for obstruction and the Supreme Court of 
Canada verified this to be correct. Ms. Guthrie, of course, was not 
found to have committed an offence but was found "in suspicious 
circumstances". The cases therefore are distinct from one another. 
In another well known case, Rice v. Connolly2, the circumstances were 
"invitingly similar"' to those in this Guthrie case. The suspect was 
found in the dark hQurs acting suspiciously in an area in which break 
and entry offences had occurred. It was found that he had a lawful 
excuse for refusing to answer questions put to him by police and that 
at most there was a moral obligation to cooperate with police to solve 
crime. 
1 ' [1978] 6 W.W.R. 462 
2 [1966) 2 QB 414 
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In this Guthrie case, there was "no apparent commission" of an offence 
known to law. The accused's failure to identify herself and her 
refusal to answer questions "arose within lawful excuse and did not 
constitute the obstruction charge". 
Appeal allowed 
Conviction quashed 
Note: In quashing the conviction, the Court of Appeal did not comment 
on the legality of the arrest the officers effected. The accused's 
refusal to cooperate in any way, and the finding of the open car door, 
coupled with the fact that cars had recently been rifled, would have 
to be weighed to determine if the officer's beliefs were reasonable 
and probable to make the arrest. The alleged obstruction did not 
arise from the arrest; rather the arrest arose from the obstruction. 
Having been lawfully arrested and then failing to identify oneself 
does not amount to obstruction; and, of course, remaining silent when 
questioned, is one's right. · In other words, when the identification 
was demanded, the information available to the officers at that point 
in time did not oblige the accused to identify herself. 
* * * * * 
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SEAllCBIRG A LAW OFFICE - PRIVILEGED COtlMDBICATIOB 
Supreme Court of Canada June 1982 Simon Descoteaux, Centre Commucu-
taire Juridique de Montreal v. Alexandre Mierzwinski and Le Procureur 
de la Province de Quebec and Le Barreau du quebec, La Commission des 
Droits de la Personne. 
Investigators searched a law office and seized a form for which a Mr. 
Ledoux provided the information. The form had been completed by t he 
clerical staff for him (Mr. Ledoux) to receive legal services at the 
taxpayers' expense. Giving false information on an application form 
to receive legal aid is a false pretence, held the Supreme Court of 
Canada. However, the court had to respond to a defence submission if 
the form and the information it contained were admissible in evidence, 
as it was part and parcel of the priviliged communication the accused 
had with his lawyer. 
In point form, the Supreme Court of Canada held: 
1. As soon as a potential client takes the first steps, even before 
the formal retainer is established, the communications made 
between solicitor and client are priviliged. 
2. It does not matter if the communications are in regards to the 
means to pay for the legal services sought, they are priviliged. 
3. The co11111.unications between the client and the solicitor's staff 
is included in the principle of confidentiality. 
4. However, communications which are in themselves criminal or are 
advice to facilitate the commission of a crime are not 
priviliged. 
When documents are to be searched for, a justice of the peace issuing 
a search warrant has no jurisdiction to order seizure of documents 
which are inadmissible in evidence because they are privileged. The 
form that DI.1st be filled out to obtain legal aid is protected as it is 
part of receiving legal advice. When false information is given in 
regards to the applicant's financial means, then the content of the 
form in regards to those means only, is criminal in itself and 
admissible in evidence. 
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The legal aid lawyers had refused to give any information to the 
investigators or release the form to them. Hence there was no reason-
able alternative but to apply for a search warrant. 
Said the unanimous Supreme Court: 
"Perhaps, as a result of their investigation, 
they knew that Ledoux was not eligible for 
legal aid in view of his financial means, but 
the crime of which they suspected him and 
concerning which they were entitled to con-
tinue the investigation was that of having 
concealed his means, ineligibility not being 
a crime in itself". 
The Supreme Court of Canada suggested procedures when a Justice of the 
Peace issues a search warrant for documents in a law office. The 
Court said it is appropriate for the Justice of the Peace to make 
certain conditions in respect to the warrant. As for instance in this 
case, the Justice could have ordered that the document (the applica-
tion form) be delivered to him in a sealed envelope. That, in the 
presence of the parties (Crown, defence and legal aid) be examined the 
document to determine if it contained confidential (privileged) infor-
mation, irrelevant to the facts in issue (Ledoux, financial means). 
He could obliterate the privileged information, photocopy what is 
relevant, and seal the original document in an envelope for presenta-
tion to the Court. 
The Court emphasized that each case will be different and drew a dis-
tinction between situations where the lawyer is the victim of his 
clients (as in this case) and where he is the accomplice. In the 
latter, little, if any, information will be privileged. 
The Supreme Court of Canada ordered the 
form to be returned to the Justice of the 
Peace and to be dealt with as described 
above. 
* * * * * 
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USING A CREDIT CARD OBTAI.DD BY THE OOMMISSIOR OF A CJUHE (FillDIRG) 
R. v. Costello B. C. Court of Appeal October 1982 CA810630 
A synopsis of this case (whe:n it was before the County Court) can be 
found on page 25 of our Volume No. 4. 
Costello appealed his conviction of using a credit card obtained by 
the coDDD.ission of a crime to the B. C. Court of Appeal. 
Costello testified that he had found the credit card in question on 
the street in front of his house. He had placed it on a shelf in the 
kitchen and there it stayed for several days without the accused 
having any intention of using it. However, one evening the accused 
received an unexpected invitation to have some drinks with friends in 
a bar. When the friends ran out of money, the accused retrieved and 
used the found credit card. 
His defence was that he had found the card and had not "obtained" it 
by the commission of a crime. He argued that once he procured the 
card, the act of "obtaining" ended. 
As the Supreme Court of Canada held* in 197 5, in circumstances as 
these, there are two stages to "obtaining". The first may be totally 
innocent and lawful, however, when the intention was formed to convert 
the property (the credit card in this case) to his own use, the second 
stage of "obtaining" was concluded. 
Said the B. C. Court of Appeal: 
"He had committed theft. Thereafter he was 
in possession of a stolen credit card, with 
the requisite guilty knowledge and the 
of fence with which be was charged was com-
pleted when he used the card". 
Accused's conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Maroney 18 CCC (2d) 257 
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TmBITS 
Criminal Justice 
A lawyer (defending someone charged with a serious criminal offence) 
consulted an experienced "learned friend" from another province. A 
brilliant defence resulted. The consulted barrister urged his 
colleague to wire the verdict as soon as it was known. 
Defence counsel's telegram read: 
"Justice was done". 
The consulting attorney responded: 
"Appeal immediately". 
* * * * * 
Charter of Rights 
Section 688 of the Criminal Code (dangerous offenders legislation) was 
recently challenged in the B. C. Supreme Court in that it violates 
section 7 and 9 of the Charter of Rights. 
Section 688 c.c. uses permissive language in giving judges the power 
to imprison indeterminately in that it uses the word "may". There-
fore, the fundamental principle of justice (section 7 of the Charter) 
that similar individuals must be treated similarly is being vio-
lated claimed the defence. It was also claimed that some of the 
provisions under section 688 c.c. amounted to arbitrary detention. 
The Supreme Court Justice said that the arguments raised were .. down-
right silly" and that lack of logic was inherent in the defence sub-
mission. 
Imprisonment based on law is not arbitrary within the meaning of 
section 9 of the Charter. Furthermore, judicial discretion to 
imprison one person and not another is necessary if there is to be 
even the shadow of a hope of an equitable system. Therefore, the dis-
cretion granted to the Judiciary by section 688 c.c. does not violate 
section 9 of the Charter. 
R. v. Gustavso~ C.C.#810372 B. C. Supreme Court October 1982 
* * * * * 
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The accused was served with a photocopy of 
technician's certificate. Unfortunately it was a 
document could not be read through as words 
obscured. The defence argued that this meant that 
on the accused. The Court agreed and said: 
the breathalyzer 
poor copy and ·the 
were blurred and 
no copy was served 
"In this appeal the certificate given to the 
appellant was so poor that I find it was not 
a 'copy'. Parts were blurred and some 
completely illegible. It was, therefore, not 
admissible as evidence". 
R. v. McLennan County Court of Vancouver No. CC820675 Vancouver 
Registry 
* * * * * 
The arresting officer was present when two samples of the accused's 
breath were analyzed. The officer testified that each sample had 
consisted of "three puffs". The two analyses resulted in a certifi-
cate giving readings of 180 and 170 ml. respectively. The defence 
claimed that there was evidence of six samples of breath while only 
two were adduced in evidence by means of a certificate. Therefore, it 
was possible that any one of "the puffs" were lower than the readings 
on the certificate; afterall 1 the lowest reading is the one that 
counts. This meant that the Court had to decide what is to be cata-
gorized as "a sample". The Criminal Code obliged the accused to 
provide a sample of breath suitable to enable an analysis to be made 
• • • Case law states that "it is for the qualified technician to 
determine, on the basis of his training, the suitability of a sample 
of breath given for the required analysis". ' 
In this case, the aggregate of three puffs amounted to one sample the 
technician considered suitable for analysis. In other words, the 
"puffs" were not samples within the meaning of s. 237 of the Criminal 
Code. The accused's acquittal in Provincial Court was set aside and 
the County Court found him guilty. 
The Queen and Adkin County Court of Vancouver Island Victoria 
Registry No. 21884 October 1982 
* * * * * 
